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Education and household inequality change: a decomposition analysis for India 
 
Janneke Pieters1  
 
Abstract 
Previous studies show that rising returns to education have lead to higher wage inequality in 
developing countries. However, given the importance of non-wage employment and indirect effects of 
education through labour supply and fertility choices, a similar relationship does not necessarily hold 
for inequality between households. Based on a decomposition analysis for India, we find 
counteracting impacts of education on household expenditure inequality. Declining returns to 
education of household heads reduced inequality, driven by the self-employed. In contrast, rising 
returns to spouses’ education increased inequality in urban areas. We also find that changes in 
education levels increased rural and urban inequality, due to persistently high illiteracy. Finally, the 
indirect effect on fertility had a small equalizing impact in urban areas, but slightly increased 
inequality in rural areas. 
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Inequality is rising in many developing countries, but the determinants of changes in inequality are 
not well understood. Recent research, both theoretical and empirical, has focused on the individual 
earnings distribution (for example, Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Zhu and Trefler, 2005; Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2007). Due to skill-biased technical change and international trade demand for high-skilled 
labour is growing faster than supply, raising the returns to education. This appears to be the major 
cause of rising earnings inequality in developed and developing countries.  
But does a similar relationship also hold for household inequality? Household welfare is more 
relevant from a welfare perspective than individual income: resources are, at least to some extent, 
shared among household members. As such, household inequality measures are more representative of 
a country’s inequality situation and an important characteristic of the development process.2 
Household inequality, defined as inequality of household income or consumption expenditure, differs 
from individual earnings inequality in level as well as changes. For industrialised countries differences 
have been ascribed to, for example, increased working hours of married women and changes in 
government benefits (see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Gottschalk and Danziger, 2005). The 
relative importance of these and other factors will be country-specific, but for developing countries in 
general there are two main reasons why education is related differently to household inequality than to 
earnings inequality. 
First and foremost, besides earnings from formal employment, households have income from 
other sources. This is especially important in developing countries where a large part of workers is 
self-employed in the informal sector. The self-employed are often excluded in studies of the individual 
earnings distribution, but their returns to education are likely to be lower than for employees. 
Moreover, the education level of self-employed is lower, on average, than of formal sector employees 
(Van der Sluis et al., 2005). Rising wage-returns to education may tell us little about household 
inequality if a large part of household income is earned outside wage employment. 
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Second, education has indirect effects on income, for example through labour supply, occupational 
choices, and fertility decisions (Ram, 1989). These factors could leave the individual earnings 
distribution unaffected, but they do matter for household inequality. For example, if higher education 
increases labour force participation of women, this will increase income of households with highly 
educated women. If these are relatively affluent households, household inequality will rise even if the 
earnings distribution is unchanged. A positive effect of education on an individual’s earnings is thus 
only part of the total returns to education. 
Compared to the many detailed studies on earnings, much less attention has been paid to changes 
in household inequality. Existing cross-country empirical evidence shows a weak relationship between 
education and household inequality (Ram, 1989; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002), which is not surprising 
given the multitude of factors that play a role. In this paper we focus on the increase in household 
expenditure inequality in India between 1993-1994 and 2004-2005. India has experienced rapid 
growth since the economic reforms of the early 1990s and several studies of the earnings distribution 
show that rising returns to education are the main cause for increased earnings inequality (for example, 
Kijima, 2006). India is an important case to study inequality beyond the distribution of earnings, since 
a large share of workers is self-employed.3 Moreover, India has one of the most unequal education 
distributions in the world. Given the widespread attention to inequality of earnings due to education so 
far, it is highly relevant to ask how much and how education has actually contributed to the increase in 
household inequality.  
The increase in household inequality in India is decomposed using household survey data and a 
regression-based method developed by Bourguignon et al. (2008). With this method it is possible to 
distinguish different channels through which education and other household or individual 
characteristics are related to household inequality. Like the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, it 
separates the distributional effect of changes in characteristics themselves versus changes in the 
returns to these characteristics. Rather than explaining differences in means between two distributions, 
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however, the Bourguignon-method decomposed changes in the entire distribution. In contrast to other 
methods that compare full distributions (Juhn et al., 1993; DiNardo et al., 1996; Machado and Mata, 
2005), this method focuses explicitly on the household income distribution, incorporating changes in 
individuals’ occupational choice and earnings, and in household composition. As such, direct and 
indirect effects of education can be measured.  
The Bourguignon-method has been applied to a number of East Asian and Latin American 
countries in Bourguignon et al. (2005) and Ferreira and Leite (2004). These in-depth country studies 
show that the indirect effects of education can matter for household inequality. The present study 
focuses specifically on the role of education, rather than asking more generally which factors explain 
observed changes in inequality. In the analysis we distinguish the returns to education, direct and 
indirect effects of educational attainment, and the role of different household members. 
Our results show that declining returns to education of household heads had an equalizing effect in 
both rural and urban India. In urban India this is driven by the household heads that are self-employed, 
which stresses the importance of taking into account non-wage income in inequality analyses. As 
opposed to household heads, returns to education of spouses increased urban inequality. This finding 
suggests that female earnings and labour force participation are important for inequality dynamics, but 
more research on the relationship between women’s education and labour supply is needed. Further, 
we find that changes in educational attainment had a strong adverse direct effect on inequality, due to 
the persistently high prevalence of illiteracy. This underlines the importance of expanding schooling 
for the poorest households in India. In addition, the indirect effect of education through fertility 
changes increased rural inequality, because the number of children declined less in poorer households. 
In urban India the indirect effect was opposite: inequality decreased somewhat because poorer 
households had, on average, a greater decline in the number of children. An improvement in the 
distribution of education could stimulate a more equalizing effect of fertility changes as well. 
After describing inequality and other key characteristics of India in section 2, the Bourguignon-
method is discussed in section 3. Section 4 summarises estimation results that are part of the 
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decomposition analysis, and in section 5 the final decomposition results are discussed. Finally, section 
6 concludes.  
 
2. Inequality in India 
To measure household inequality, one can use either income or expenditure data. For India, only 
household expenditure is available, as recorded in the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) 
Consumer Expenditure survey. Inequality in consumption expenditure can be viewed as more 
permanent inequality than income inequality, as consumption expenditure is affected by households’ 
ability to use savings, borrowing, or insurance arrangements to buffer shocks in income. Since survey 
data always refer to a limited time period, consumption expenditure reflects living standards more 
accurately than income (see Deaton and Zaidi, 2002).  
In a recent paper, Datt and Ravallion (2009, Table 2) show that consumption inequality in India 
increased significantly after 1991, when major reforms took place: the trend changed from negative to 
positive in rural India and from zero to positive in urban India. Table 1 shows the Gini coefficient and 
Theil index for inequality in monthly per capita expenditure4 (household consumption expenditure 
divided by household size, henceforth MPCE) in 1993-94 and 2004,-055 which both increased in rural 
and urban India. Although growth in income levels reduced poverty in the 1980s and especially after 
the reforms in the 1990s, the increase in inequality in the post-reform period adversely affected the 
poor (Dhongde, 2007). 
Table 1: Inequality of Monthly per Capita Expenditure 
Rural   Urban 
Year Gini Theil   Gini Theil 
1993 29.4 18.0  35.4 24.8 
2004 30.7 20.8   37.4 28.1 
Note: Figures based on 17 major states plus urban Delhi.  
Source: NSSO Consumer Expenditure survey 
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 In constant prices and spatially deflated, based on the price indexes by Deaton (2003) for 1987-1999 and the 
official Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labour and Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers for 
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available at the state level until 1999. 
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 Henceforth 1993 and 2004. These ‘thick’ survey rounds use the same reference period, whereas the survey in 
1999-2000 used mixed reference periods. It is by now well-established that this affected measures of poverty and 
inequality, so the 1999-2000 measures are not comparable (see Deaton and Drèze, 2002). 
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The distribution of earnings in India has been studied in detail. Chamarbagwala (2006) finds that 
in the period 1983-1999, relative demand shifted to more high-skilled workers especially in the service 
sector, causing a considerable increase in the wage gap between high- and low-educated workers. 
Dutta (2006) also finds evidence for a widening wage gap between graduate and primary education 
(for regular salaried employees), contributing to the rise in wage inequality in the 1990s. Kijima 
(2006) considers changes in both the returns to education and in educational attainment of male urban 
fulltime workers. She finds that between 1983 and 1993 the latter accounted most for increased 
earnings inequality. Between 1993 and 1999, on the other hand, earnings inequality increased mostly 
due to rising returns to higher education caused by within-industry demand shifts. There seems to be 
no doubt the wage gap between low- and high- skilled workers in India has grown, in line with the 
experience of many other countries. Due to data limitations, however, analyses of the earnings 
distribution include only wage workers or even a subsample of them, while about 40 per cent of the 
urban labour force and 55 per cent of the rural labour force is self-employed. Female workers are also 
excluded from most studies, though female labour supply is an important issue in India’s development. 
According to Chamarbagwala (2006: 2003), especially highly educated women entered the labour 
force during the 1980s and 1990s, though other studies stress more poverty-induced female 
participation (for example Raikhy and Mehra, 2003). All in all, women’s earnings matter for 
household income and inequality, but little is known about their distribution and the role of education. 
Apart from Kijima (2006), not much attention is paid to the distributive effect of changing 
educational endowments in India. With over 30 per cent of the adult population illiterate, India has a 
very unequal distribution of education, and much scope for improvement. According to Kochhar et al. 
(2006) and Mazumdar and Sarkar (2008) government policies have been biased towards  higher 
education, devoting insufficient resources to improving and expanding  lower education. The 
government of India realises that investment in higher education is necessary to enable further growth, 
but expanding basic education is necessary to reduce inequality (Government of India, 2008). From a 
policy perspective, therefore, it is also important to know to what extent educational endowment 
changes affect household inequality. 
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The distribution of educational attainment in 1993 and 2004 is summarised in table 2. Educational 
attainment is substantially higher in urban than in rural India and higher for males than for females. 
During this period schooling levels have increased, but the share of illiterate adults remains high.  
 
Table 2: Educational attainment in India, percentage distribution 
  Rural   Urban 
Male  Female  Male  Female Education level 
completed 1993 2004   1993 2004   1993 2004   1993 2004 
Illiterate 45.85 35.03  75.54 63.82  17.91 13.25  40.10 31.03 
Below primary 14.68 9.62  7.91 6.53  10.86 6.22  9.93 6.69 
Primary 12.46 15.27  7.16 10.85  12.49 12.54  11.85 11.87 
Middle 12.32 18.62  5.23 10.08  15.91 19.45  12.23 15.91 
Secondary 11.66 16.11  3.55 7.05  26.73 27.03  16.60 20.55 
Graduate or above 3.04 5.34  0.61 1.68  16.10 21.51  9.28 13.96 
Total 100 100   100 100   100 100   100 100 
Note: Figures are based on all individuals of age 20 and higher. 
Source: NSSO Consumer Expenditure survey 
 
As suggested by Ram (1989), the increased schooling of women may lead to a reduction in 
fertility. Education of women is generally negatively related to fertility, because desired family size 
declines and the ability to achieve the planned number of children improves with education. Between 
1981 and 1991, women’s education and child mortality were the most important factors explaining 
fertility differences across Indian states and over time (Drèze and Murthi, 2001). Since household 
expenditure is measured on a per capita basis and children typically do not generate much income for 
the household, fewer children are associated with higher per capita expenditure. Changes in the 
average level and distribution of education among women could therefore affect household inequality 
through changes in fertility. The NSSO data show that during 1993-2004 there was a decline in the 
average number of children per household (table 3). In both years, beyond the level ‘Below primary’, 
higher educational attainment is associated with a lower number of children. Over time, the average 
number of children declined at all educational levels. Average household size (not shown) did not 




Table 3: Average number of children per household, by female education level 
Rural   Urban Average education level 
females 1993 2004  1993 2004 
Illiterate 2.04 2.03  2.06 1.88 
Below primary 2.17 2.02  1.92 1.91 
Primary 1.99 1.80  1.81 1.62 
Middle 1.79 1.64  1.66 1.45 
Secondary 1.60 1.46  1.42 1.29 
Graduate and above 1.23 1.09  1.17 0.95 
Total 1.96 1.88  1.62 1.43 
Note: Children are household members of age 15 or younger. Educational level is the average 
of all adult females in the household. The total average includes households with no adult 
females. Source: NSSO Consumer Expenditure survey. 
 
 
3. Method and Application 
After discussing the decomposition framework and some India-specific considerations in section 
3.1, the empirical strategy is explained in more detail in section 3.2  
 
3.1 Decomposing changes in household inequality 
Bourguignon et al. (2005) and Bourguignon et al. (2008) develop a microeconometric 
decomposition of changes in the household income distribution that is designed to analyze household 
income inequality. The method is a generalization of the decomposition developed by Oaxaca (1973) 
and Blinder (1973), who separate inequality of mean income between groups into differences in 
characteristics, differences in returns to characteristics, and differences in the residual or unobserved 
factors. Using micro-economic data, the decomposition can be applied to the entire distribution of 
income, rather than their means. The difference with DiNardo et al. (1996) and Juhn et al. (1993) is 
that the level of analysis is the household rather than the individual, while is does account for 
individuals’ characteristics. Education, labour force participation and earnings are modeled at the 
individual level and household income is the sum of its members’ earnings, plus non-earnings income.  
To decompose changes in inequality into endowment effects (the effect of changes in the 
distribution of household characteristics) and price effects (the effect of changes in the returns to these 
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characteristics), distributional counterfactuals are constructed. Let )(yf t  be the distribution of MPCE 
in year t. X is a vector of household characteristics, and )(Xtχ  is the joint distribution of all elements 
of X in year t. Denoting )( Xyg t , the distribution of income conditional on X, the marginal 
distribution of MPCE in year t can be expressed as: 
∫= dXXXygyf ttt )()()( χ .    (1) 
The change in the distribution of MPCE between two years is thus a function of the change in 
)( Xyg  (the price effect) and the change in )(Xχ  (the endowment effect). 
The empirical equations are explained below, but for now note that expenditure of household h in 
year t, yht, is a function of the vector Xht of household characteristics. Further, yht depends on the vector 
βt of parameters reflecting the returns to those characteristics, on the vector εht of unobservable 
characteristics, the vector γt of parameters reflecting educational attainment, and vector θt of 
parameters reflecting fertility choices. 
),,,,( tthtththt XFy θγεβ= .    (2) 
A change in household income, due to a change in one or some of the components of Eqn. 2, leads to a 
change in the distribution of income )(yf t . The impact of each component can be simulated by 
replacing it by its counterpart of another year, say from year t=0 to t=1. For example, the vector β0 is 
replaced by β1 while keeping everything else constant. This gives: 
),,,,()( 0001010 θγεββ hhh XFy = .    (3) 
The contribution of the change in β to the total change in the income distribution (the so-called price 
effect) is then simply 
)()( 010 yfyf −→β .     (4) 
The same analogy applies to the other components of Eqn. 2. Since the entire distribution is simulated, 
the difference can be evaluated based on any measure of inequality. 
Although the decomposition compares separate cross-sections, rather than following households 
within a panel dataset, the data requirements for this method are high. Ideally, one has individual 
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earnings data and characteristics such as age and education, as well as household level non-earnings 
income and characteristics such as household size and composition. For India, there is no dataset that 
combines individual level earnings and employment details with household level income. The 
National Sample Survey on employment and unemployment (the usual source of earnings data for 
India) does not record earnings for self-employed workers or total household income. Since a large 
part of workers is self-employed, total recorded household earnings are not even representative for 
actual household income from labour. Due to these data restrictions, household inequality analysis is 
based on the consumer expenditure survey. This survey offers a reliable measure of welfare (MPCE), 
but no individual employment and earnings details. Fortunately, the consumer expenditure survey does 
report individuals’ level of educational attainment, age, and gender, and principal employment status, 
industry, and occupation of the household head. These characteristics are used in the analysis, as 
explained below. 
Using these expenditure data means individual earnings and labour supply decisions cannot be 
estimated. The household-returns to education therefore include wage-returns and the effect of 
education on hours worked and industry or sector of employment. In other words, the estimated 
household-returns to education include direct and indirect effects, except for those controlled for 
(number of children and the household heads’ employment status, industry, and occupation).  
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
All data are obtained from the NSSO Consumer Expenditure surveys of 1993-94 and 2004-05, and 
are in 1993-94 constant prices and spatially deflated. To measure the price and endowment effects on 
the distribution of MPCE, parameters β, γ, and θ, and the residuals ε need to be estimated. This section 
gives the three empirical equations and describes in more detail how the price and endowment effects 
of education are obtained. 
First of all, MPCE is regressed on household characteristics, separately for rural and urban 
households:  
htththt XMPCE εβ +=)ln( ,    (5) 
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where the vector Xht is specified in Appendix table A.1. Table A.2 shows the OLS estimation results. 
Second, the educational attainment level is estimated by an ordered probit model, with six 
different levels of education: (1) Illiterate; (2) Literate below primary school; (3) Primary school 
complete; (4) Middle school complete; (5) Secondary or higher secondary school complete; and (6) 
Graduate and above. Educational attainment XE is estimated separately for the head, the spouse, and 
other members, and separately for rural and urban areas: 
[ ] ( ) ( )tEFittktEFittkEit XFXFkX γαγα −−− −−−== ,1,Pr ,  (6) 
where i is the individual, k(=1,…,6) is the highest education level completed, and F is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. The cut-off values αkt are estimated along with the regression 
parameters γt. The vector Xit−EF includes gender, age (in linear splines), social group, religion, and 
state. The number of children is not included in this vector because education is itself an explanatory 
variable in the model for number of children.  
For the number of children, XF, an ordered probit model is estimated at the household level, 
separately for rural and urban areas: 
[ ] ( ) ( )tFhttmtFhttmFht XFXFmX θαθα −−− −−−== ,1,Pr ,   (7) 
Where the number of children m=1,…,12 and F is again the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. The vector Xht−F includes gender and age of the head, number of adult females, average age 
of adult females in linear splines, average education of adult females, social group, religion, and state. 
Since the data do not allow us to identify which children belong to which mother, age and education 
are averaged over all adult females (20 years or older) in the household.  
Now, to obtain the price effect of education, a counterfactual distribution is constructed using 
1993-94 as the base year. This is year t=0, while 2004-05 is year t=1. For each year, the vector of 
coefficients βˆ  in Eqn. 5 is estimated, and residuals are stored in εˆ . Next, in the base-year vector 0ˆβ , 
the coefficients for all education dummies are replaced by their counterparts from the end-year 
vector 1ˆβ . The resulting vector is simβˆ . Finally, the value of MPCE is simulated for each household 
using base-year characteristics and unobservables: 00, ˆˆ)ln( hsimhsimh XMPCE εβ += . The distribution 
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of simulated MPCE is the so-called counterfactual distribution. The difference between inequality in 
the 1993-94 distribution and inequality in the counterfactual distribution is the contribution of the 
price effect of education to inequality. The price effects of other variables are calculated in a similar 
way in order to assess the relative importance of education. 
To find the endowment effect of education on the distribution of MPCE, a counterfactual 
distribution is obtained by changing educational attainment in Xht in Eqn. 5. The educational 
attainment of individuals in the base-year sample is ‘updated’ by simulation, based on the conditional 
distribution of education on individual characteristics. First, using Eqn. 6, the base-year vector of 
characteristics Xi0−EF is multiplied by the end-year coefficient vector 1γˆ . Combined with the end-year 
cut-off values 1,ˆ kα , a simulated level of education is obtained for each individual. The simulated level 
of educational attainment replaces the original value in the base- year vector of characteristics Xh0, 
which gives Xh,sim. A simulated value of MPCE for each household is obtained using base-year returns 
to characteristics and unobservables: 00., ˆˆ)ln( hsimhsimh XMPCE εβ += .  
Finally, to include the indirect effect of education through fertility changes, the number of children 
is also updated for each household, using Eqn. 7 in the following way. First, the simulated level of 
educational attainment is used to replace the original values in Xh0−F. The simulation vector of 
characteristics Xh,sim−F is used to obtain a simulated number of children, with the base-year coefficients 
0
ˆθ  and cut-off values 0,ˆmα . Then, both simulated education and simulated number of children replace 
their original values in the base-year vector of characteristics Xh0 in Eqn. 5, and again a simulated 
value of MPCE is found for each household, using 00., ˆˆ)ln( hsimhsimh XMPCE εβ += .  
 
4. Estimation Results 
Before turning to the decomposition results in section 5, the estimation results of the three empirical 
equations are presented. For the consumption equation, the discussion is focused on the returns to 
education, in section 4.1. Then the education and fertility estimations results are briefly described in 
section 4.2.  
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4.1 Returns to Education 
The household-returns to education are estimated in the consumption expenditure regression. 
When estimating household per capita expenditure, education level dummies are included separately 
for the household head, spouse, and (the average of) other members, with illiterate as reference 
category. The estimated coefficients for these variables indicate the household-returns to education, 
which are different from the returns to education estimated in a standard wage equation (wage-returns 
to education). In the present analysis, the household-returns to education include multiple possible 
ways in which education is associated with household expenditure, of which earnings is only one part. 
Other effects may run through labour participation and hours of work, which are not controlled for 
separately, or efficiency in production in the family business.  
 Figures 1 shows the coefficient estimates for education of the household head and spouse in rural 
and urban India, respectively. For the household head, both rural and urban household-returns to 
education declined at all levels (compared to zero returns for the illiterate). This means that differences 
in expenditure between households with high- and low-educated heads became smaller during 1993-
2004. Although between some adjacent education levels the difference in returns increased (for 
example between secondary and graduate education in rural India), overall the returns became less 
dispersed.  
The picture is quite different for the spouses’ household-returns to education. During 1993-2004 
the structure of returns clearly became more convex, especially in urban India. The difference in 
expenditure level between households with low- and high-educated spouses thus increased over the 
period. 
The returns to education of other members (not shown) were only about half those for the head 
and spouse, and turn out to have negligible impact on household inequality. For inequality, the 
education coefficient estimates suggest that the price effect of education will differ between the head 
and spouse of the household: especially in urban India, where they have changed in opposite 
directions. This is a first indication that rising earnings inequality may explain little of the increase in 
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household expenditure inequality. Whereas the wage-returns to education increased for males and 
females in rural and urban India, the household-returns are different. 
 
Figure 1: Estimated returns to education, household head and spouse 
(a) Rural, head     (b) Rural, spouse 
 
 
(c) Urban, head     (d) Urban, spouse 
 
Source: NSSO Consumer Expenditure survey and author’s calculations. 
 
4.2 Education and fertility 
In principle, the models for education and fertility in this analysis are used to obtain information 
on their conditional distributions, to be able to simulate endowment changes. Because education and 
number of children are explanatory variables in the MPCE equation, consumption expenditure itself is 
not included as explanatory variable in either the education or the fertility model. For this reason, these 
models cannot be regarded as proper economic models (see Bourguignon et al. (2005) for more 
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In total, 12 ordered probit models of educational attainment were estimated: one for each year for 
rural and urban India, and for the head, spouse, and other household members separately. The results 
for household head and spouse are summarised in appendix tables A.3 and A.4. All results show that 
females have lower education than males, as do individuals belonging to a backward social group 
(scheduled caste or tribe), though the disadvantage of scheduled caste members declined between 
1993 and 2004. Also, Muslims have on average lower education than Hindus, while Christians and 
other non-Hindus have significantly higher education levels.  
The results for number of children are summarised in appendix table A.5. These indicate that a 
higher average education level of adult females is associated with a lower number of children in the 
household. At higher levels of education the negative effect becomes larger, so the negative 
relationship is stronger. This could indicate that as female education levels rise, average fertility rates 
will fall more at higher levels of education, which could increase inequality.  
We now turn to the results of the decomposition analysis, comparing actual and counterfactual 
distribution to measure the various distributive effects of education.  
 
5. Decomposition Results 
In the decomposition analysis the price effects of all characteristics and the endowment effect of 
education (with and without the indirect effect through changes in the number of children) are 
simulated. An important note here is that the total change in the distribution cannot be decomposed 
additively into the changes of the components in Eqn. 2. Still, the size and direction of the price and 
endowment effects can be compared to each other and to the total change in inequality, in order to 
determine the relative importance of each. Another issue is that the results depend on which year is 
chosen as base-year. The choice of base-year determines, for example, at which distribution of 
characteristics (Xh) the price effect (the change in β) is evaluated. For the price effect, 
)()()()( 011010 yfyfyfyf →→ −≠− ββ ,   (8) 
and this applies to all components. In other words, the contribution to inequality made by one specific 
component is sensitive to the order in which the components are analyzed, which is a problem of path 
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dependency. Devicienti (2009) shows that each component’s Shapley-value can be calculated as the 
average of its contribution to inequality across all possible decomposition paths. However, since we 
look at educational attainment of the household head, spouse, and other members separately, as well as 
the indirect fertility effect, the number of different possible decomposition paths is large, and 
calculating the Shapley-value is quite cumbersome. Instead, we focus on two decomposition paths. 
The first path uses 1993 as base-year, measuring the contribution of each component when it is first in 
the decomposition path. The second path uses 2004 as base-year, measuring the contribution of each 
component when it is last in the decomposition path. The average of both paths is reported as well. 
The distributions are summarised using the Gini coefficients, but other measures, including the log 
deviation and the Theil index, give similar results.  
 
Table 4: Decomposition inequality change 1993-2004 
  
Rural  Urban 
  Path 1 Path 2 Average  Path 1 Path 2 Average 
Gini 1993 29.4 29.4 29.4  35.4 35.4 35.4 
Gini 2004 30.7 30.7 30.7  37.4 37.4 37.4 
Total change 1.3 1.3 1.3  2.0 2.0 2.0 
Price effects        
Total 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.6 1.2 0.9 
Age 0.1 0.1 0.1  -0.1 0.1 0.0 
Education all  -0.4 -0.4 -0.4  0.2 0.6 0.4 
  __head -0.3 -0.4 -0.4  -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
  __spouse 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.7 0.9 0.8 
  __others 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.1 0.1 
Children 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Household size 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Social group 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 
Religion 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Status 0.2 0.1 0.2  0.1 0.2 0.1 
Occupation 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Industry -0.2 -0.3 -0.2  0.2 0.2 0.2 
State 0.3 0.4 0.4  -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 
Endowment effects       
Education all 0.3 0.5 0.4  -0.1 0.7 0.3 
  __ head 0.1 0.2 0.2  -0.2 0.3 0.0 
  __ spouse 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.1 0.5 0.3 
  __ others 0.1 0.0 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Educ. all + children 0.6 0.5 0.5  -0.2 0.5 0.2 
Note: 1993 is base-year in Path 1, 2004 is base-year in Path2. Source: Author’s calculations based on NSSO 
Consumer Expenditure survey 
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The first two rows in table 4 show inequality observed in 1993 and 2004, while the other rows 
show the difference in Gini coefficient between the counterfactual distribution and the base-year 
distribution. Both rural and urban inequality increased in this period, and all price effects combined 
(“Total”) increased inequality by about one third of the total increase. Compared to other household 
characteristics (except for State in rural India6) changing household-returns to education had the 
largest impact on household inequality.7 
In rural India, changes in the returns to education reduced inequality even though observed 
inequality increased. It is entirely driven by the returns to education of the household head, while the 
price effect of spouses’ and others’ education is zero. This is in line with the changes in coefficients 
shown in figure 1(a) and 1(b). In urban India the price effect of household head’s education is 
equalizing as well. However, this is more than offset by the price effect of spouses’ education (see 
figure 1(c) and 1(d)). The total price effect of education is therefore positive in urban India.  
The negative price effect of education of the head is surprising. In the earnings literature, 
increased inequality among workers has been ascribed to rising returns to education, especially at 
higher educational levels. The household analysis suggests that in household consumption 
expenditure, differences associated with education of the household head have actually become 
smaller. It is the spouse’s education that has become more important for household consumption, 
increasing urban inequality. This issue will be discussed further at the end of this section.  
The endowment effect of education is positive in both rural and urban India, which means changes 
in education attainment levels contributed to higher inequality. The urban endowment effect is driven 
mainly by the spouses, though the two decomposition paths give quite different results.8 For both 
periods, a mobility matrix can be made comparing base-year and simulated education levels. The 
simulation shows what education level a person from the 1993-sample would have if he or she was in 
the 2004-sample (or the other way around, depending on the choice of bas-year), given his or her age, 
                                                 
6
 The positive price effect of state indicates between-state divergence of rural households’ expenditure, after 
controlling for the other household characteristics. This could reflect, for example, differences in state-level 
welfare policies or in agricultural productivity. 
7
 The price effects of education are robust to the specification of the MPCE equation: the results are similar when 
only age, education, household size, state and survey subround are included as regressors.  
8
 This is due to several factors: differences in the simulation of education itself, differences in prices at which 
these endowment changes are evaluated, and differences in the distribution of other household characteristics. 
 18 
gender, social group, religion, and state. An example is given below in table 5 for the education of 
spouses in rural India, according to path 1. As this matrix shows, most progress in terms of educational 
attainment is made by individuals who are literate and completed up to middle school (levels 2, 3, and 
4). This pattern appears in all simulations; for rural and urban, for heads, spouses, and other members. 
On average, relatively little progress is made by the group of illiterates, which explains why the direct 
endowment effect of education was to increase inequality. It implies there is scope for improvement in 
the distribution of education and household expenditure, by focusing more on expanding schooling for 
the lowest class. 
 
Table 5: Simulated education mobility matrix, spouses in rural India 















1 – Illiterate 86.7 8.6 4.8 0 0 0 100 
2 – Below primary 0.1 6.0 80.4 13.4 0 0 100 
3 – Primary 0 0 15.3 80.8 3.9 0 100 
4 – Middle 0 0 0 29.8 70.1 0.1 100 
5 – Secondary 0 0 0 0 68.8 31.3 100 
6 – Graduate and higher 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 
Source: NSSO Consumer Expenditure survey and author’s calculations. 
 
Finally, the effect of changes in the number of children is added to the direct endowment effect of 
education, which is shown in the bottom row of table 4 (“Educ. all + children”).  The indirect effect 
increases rural inequality further, but is equalizing in urban India as the combined direct and indirect 
endowment effect is smaller than the direct endowment effect. Among rural households, those with 
higher initial expenditure level have a higher increase in the average female education level in path1 
(in path 2 there is no clear association). Consequently, there also appears a slightly negative 
relationship between initial expenditure and change in the number of children (the decline is larger for 
richer households), which is why inequality rises. In urban India, average female education increases 
most in the bottom half of the initial expenditure distribution, in both paths. Among urban households, 




5.2 Total returns versus earnings-returns to education 
Our results indicate that during 1993-2004 the change in returns to education increased urban 
inequality. This is in line with many previous studies that found that rising wage-returns to education 
caused higher wage inequality. However, the effect on household expenditure inequality was caused 
entirely by higher and more convex returns to education of the spouse. Returns to education of the 
head actually declined and became more equal. In rural India, as well, returns to education of the 
household head declined and contributed to a reduction in inequality. Although several studies have 
shown that earnings inequality increased in the 1990s due to rising wage-returns to education, for 
household heads the opposite is found at the household level.  
A possible explanation is that the returns to education outside wage-employment declined (that is, 
in self-employment). Earnings inequality research for India and many other countries is based on 
wage-employees only, since often no earnings data are available for the self-employed. Since about a 
third of the urban and half of the rural household heads are self-employed, changes in self-employed 
earnings are likely to substantially influence the results. To test this, the decomposition analysis was 
done again separately for “employee” and “non-employee” households. For urban employee 
households (head is a regular or casual worker) the price effect of the head’s education is indeed 
positive, though small, in line with earnings studies. In contrast, the effect is strongly negative for the 
non-employee households (head is self-employed or other), driving the results for urban India as a 
whole. This indicates that among urban households headed by a wage-employee, inequality associated 
with the head’s education indeed increased. However, among urban households headed by a self-
employed worker, inequality associated with the head’s education level declined. Since this decline 
was relatively large, the overall price effect of the head’s education was negative.  
In rural India the price effect is negative for both employee and non-employee households. 
Regarding previous earnings studies, Kijima (2006) analyses only male urban fulltime workers, and 
studies that include both rural and urban workers do not estimate the returns to education for each 
group separately (Chamarbagwala, 2006; Dutta, 2006). Since their samples are dominated by male 
urban workers, these are likely to drive the results, and it is unclear how wage-returns to education 
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changed among rural workers. All in all, the rising wage-returns to education appear to increase 
household inequality only among urban households headed by a wage-employee. For total urban and 
rural household inequality, changes in the returns to education of household heads were equalizing. 
As opposed to urban household heads, returns to education of spouses increased urban inequality 
and dominate the total price effect of education. This could reflect increased female labour force 
participation, as the returns to education in any kind of employment are higher than in domestic work 
or unemployment. Also, more educated spouses may be more likely to enter the labour force. To shed 
light on this, table 6 shows principal activity status for urban spouses in 1993 and 2004.9  
 
Table 6: Distribution of spouses according to principal activity status, urban India 
    
 Change 1993-2004 by education level 
Principal status 1993 2004 Change  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Self-employed 6.7 8.1 1.4  2.2 1.4 2.4 2.7 1.4 1.3 
Regular employee 5.6 6.5 1.0  2.2 2.2 1.6 0.0 -5.6 -8.1 
Casual worker 4.8 3.5 -1.2  -1.7 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Unemployed 0.5 0.7 0.3  0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 
Other 82.5 81.1 -1.4  -2.8 -4.3 -4.8 -2.8 4.6 6.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Eduction level 1=illiterate, 2=below primary, 3=primary, 4=middle school, 5=secondary, 6=graduate 
and higher. Source: NSSO Employment and Unemployment survey, round 50 and 61. 
 
The declining share of ‘other’, in column 3, indicates that relatively more spouses were in the 
labour force in 2004. It is likely that the shift into self-employment and regular employment increased 
the returns to spouses’ education. However, the shift was actually opposite for spouses with secondary 
or higher education: the last two columns show that a highly educated spouse was less likely to be in 
the labour force in 2004 than in 1993. As noted in section 2, it is unclear how education and female 
labour force participation are related in India. As far as the NSSO survey data show, higher education 
is not associated with increased female labour force participation. Therefore, the increasing returns to 
                                                 
9
 Activity status of household members other than the head is not reported in the Consumer Expenditure survey, 
so cannot be accounted for in the decomposition analysis. Table 6 is based on the Employment and 
Unemployment survey to complement the decomposition results: it is based on a different sample, but both 
samples are nationally representative and cover the same time period.  
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education of spouses most likely reflect rising returns to education within activities, but more research 
is necessary to confirm this. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
From the large body of research on earnings inequality we know that rising returns to education 
have led to higher earnings inequality in many countries, including developing countries. For 
household inequality, however, the role of education is less clear. In this paper we examine the 
relationship between education and household inequality dynamics in India over the period 1993-
2004. A microeconometric decomposition of inequality changes shows the distributive effects of 
changes in returns to education, changes in educational attainment, and the indirect effect of the latter 
through fertility. The decomposition results indicate that changes in the returns to education reduced 
rural inequality and increased urban inequality, and their effect was large compared to other household 
characteristics associated with expenditure. The urban effect was driven by increasing returns to 
education of the spouse: both in rural and urban India the returns to education of the head declined and 
reduced inequality. 
This is a surprising finding given that previous research on the earnings distribution in urban India 
has shown that the wage-returns to education increased after 1993, causing higher earnings inequality 
(Chamarbagwala, 2006; Dutta, 2006; Kijima, 2006). A possible explanation for this difference is that 
the returns to education in self-employment are lower than in wage-employment. This is confirmed 
when the decomposition is done separately for employee- and non-employee-households: the returns 
to education of the head only increase for urban employee-households, while they decline for non-
employee households. Taking into account non-employees thus appears to be crucial when studying 
the evolution of household inequality. 
Contrary to the household head, the returns to spouse’s education increased urban inequality. This 
may be due to the fact that the share of spouses active in the labour market increased. However, labour 
force participation actually declined among the highest educated spouses, so the rising returns to 
education most likely reflect increasing returns to education within activities. Clearly, the role of 
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education in women’s labour force participation and earnings should be further studied in future 
research.  
Changes in educational attainment increased both rural and urban inequality. Other studies have 
found that a distribution-neutral increase in average educational attainment can increase inequality 
(see Bourguignon et al., 2005) due to the convex relationship between education and earnings. The 
present study of India shows a more alarming picture, namely, that rising educational attainment 
increased household inequality because the inequality of education itself increased. The simulation 
results indicate that educational attainment is only slowly improving for the large group of illiterate 
adults, and much faster for literates with some education. To reduce household consumption 
inequality, and inequality of education itself, stimulating literacy appears to be essential. This may 
also lead to a more equalizing indirect effect of education through fertility, which was small but 
inequality-increasing in rural India.  
In general, our study shows that household-level analysis provides new insights in addition to the 
abundant existing results from the earnings literature. It sheds more light on the relationship between 
education and household inequality, shows important differences between household members, and 
highlights the importance of labour market developments. We conclude, therefore, that research on 
individual earnings inequality needs to be complemented by further analysis at the household level to 
gain deeper insight into the dynamics of education and inequality. Especially the returns to education 
outside wage-employment and the role of education in female labour supply and earnings are 
important factors associated with household inequality. 
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Table A.1: List of explanatory variables in MPCE regression equation 
Variable Description 
Age_head Age of household head 
Age_head_sq Squared age of household head 
Age_other Average age other members 
Age_other_sq Squared average age other members 
Female_head Indicator variable for female head of household 
Educh Indicator variables for education level of household head  
Educs Indicator variables for education level of spouse  
Educo Indicator variables for average education level other members  
Nchild Number of children (age 0-15) 
N16_19 Number of teenagers (age 16-19) 
Nmale20_65 Number of male adults 
Nfem20_65 Number of female adults 
N65 Number of elderly 
Social group Indicator variables for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other* 
Religion Indicator variables for Hindu*, Muslim, Christian, or other religion 
Status 
 
Indicator variable for principal employment status: self-employed*, casual 
labour, salaried labour, or other. 
Occupation 
 
Indicator variable for principal occupation : professional, administrative, or 
other* 
Industry Indicator variable for  principal industry: ten industries 
State Indicator variable for State 
Subround Indicator variable for survey subround 
Note: * indicates reference category in MPCE regression equation. For education the reference category is 




Table A.2: Household MPCE estimation results 
 Dependent variable is ln(MPCE) Rural  Urban 
      
Variable 1993 2004   1993  2004  
Age_head 0.006*** 0.005***  0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Age_head_sq -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Age_other 0.004*** 0.004***  -0.005*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Age_other_sq -0.000*** -0.000***  0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Female_head -0.082*** -0.076***  -0.144*** -0.157*** 
 (0.012) (0.014)  (0.016) (0.022) 
Educh_2 0.091*** 0.054***  0.085*** 0.061*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.017) 
Educh_3 0.116*** 0.091***  0.125*** 0.076*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.011) (0.013) 
Educh_4 0.160*** 0.139***  0.173*** 0.151*** 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.011) (0.013) 
Educh_5 0.254*** 0.181***  0.311*** 0.247*** 
 (0.010) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.015) 
Educh_6 0.369*** 0.326***  0.490*** 0.439*** 
 (0.019) (0.018)  (0.016) (0.020) 
Educs_0 0.165*** 0.165***  0.240*** 0.304*** 
 (0.009) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.019) 
Educs_2 0.051*** 0.059***  0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (0.008) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.017) 
Educs_3 0.060*** 0.049***  0.035*** 0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.011) (0.013) 
Educs_4 0.106*** 0.091***  0.063*** 0.098*** 
 (0.012) (0.009)  (0.011) (0.015) 
Educs_5 0.157*** 0.171***  0.172*** 0.209*** 
 (0.022) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.016) 
Educs_6 0.319*** 0.357***  0.325*** 0.449*** 
 (0.049) (0.034)  (0.018) (0.022) 
Educo_0 0.139*** 0.158***  0.145*** 0.213*** 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.013) (0.018) 
Educo_2 0.051*** 0.033***  0.017 0.077*** 
 (0.008) (0.011)  (0.016) (0.024) 
Educo_3 0.084*** 0.057***  0.044*** 0.055*** 
 (0.009) (0.010)  (0.016) (0.020) 
Educo_4 0.139*** 0.091***  0.077*** 0.082*** 
 (0.011) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.020) 
Educo_5 0.171*** 0.157***  0.121*** 0.144*** 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.019) 
Educo_6 0.245*** 0.255***  0.187*** 0.238*** 
 (0.036) (0.020)  (0.018) (0.022) 
NChild -0.086*** -0.085***  -0.112*** -0.108*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.004) 
N16_19 -0.016*** -0.022***  -0.057*** -0.060*** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.006) 
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Table A.2 continued 
Nmale20_65 0.014*** 0.008**  -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.007) 
Nfemale20_65 -0.006 -0.004  -0.034*** -0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.008) 
N65 0.006 0.022***  -0.023** -0.029** 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.013) 
SC -0.100*** -0.102***  -0.094*** -0.112*** 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.011) 
ST (ref=other social group) -0.139*** -0.165***  -0.090*** -0.094*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.017) (0.022) 
Islam -0.008 -0.008  -0.029*** -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.012) 
Christian -0.049*** 0.059***  0.064*** 0.034 
 (0.015) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.022) 
Other religion (ref=Hindu) 0.050*** 0.061***  0.035** 0.149*** 
 (0.015) (0.018)  (0.016) (0.024) 
Labour (rural) -0.187*** -0.167***    
 (0.005) (0.005)    
Salaried labour (urban)    0.022*** 0.059*** 
    (0.008) (0.010) 
Casual labour (urban)    -0.202*** -0.188*** 
    (0.010) (0.013) 
Other status (ref=self-employed) -0.013 0.069***  0.015 -0.036 
 (0.011) (0.015)  (0.019) (0.034) 
Professional -0.044*** 0.020  0.073*** 0.075*** 
 (0.013) (0.021)  (0.012) (0.019) 
Administrative (ref=other) 0.084*** 0.147***  0.217*** 0.220*** 
 (0.023) (0.024)  (0.014) (0.016) 
Constant 5.854*** 5.960***  5.747*** 5.690*** 
  (0.031) (0.037)   (0.046) (0.061) 
Observations 58787 59162  37293 33279 
R-squared 0.331 0.391   0.489 0.518 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of household real monthly per capita expenditure. Estimation by OLS, 
standard errors in parentheses. Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include dummies for 




Table A.3: Results ordered probit estimation for education, household head 
  Rural, head   Urban, head 
Variable 1993 2004  1993 2004 
      
Female -0.881*** -0.913*** -0.737*** -0.902*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.040) 
Age1 -0.014*** 0.006 -0.011* 0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age2 0.014*** -0.025*** 0.023*** -0.050*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Age3 -0.031*** 0.008* -0.034*** 0.014** 
 (0.004) (0.004 (0.005) (0.007) 
Age4 0.014*** -0.012*** 0.008** -0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
SC -0.614*** -0.515*** -0.868*** -0.693*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.027) 
ST -0.705*** -0.747*** -0.589*** -0.623*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.049) (0.056) 
Islam -0.500*** -0.449*** -0.709*** -0.730*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) 
Christian 0.246*** 0.159*** 0.352*** 0.266*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.054) 
Other non-Hindu 0.102** 0.155*** 0.233*** 0.302*** 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.041) (0.051) 
Cut-off values    
1 -0.583*** -0.860*** -1.186*** -0.883*** 
 (0.051) (0.066) (0.069) (0.074) 
2 -0.127** -0.551*** -0.777*** -0.594*** 
 (0.051) (0.066) (0.069) (0.075) 
3 0.293*** -0.105 -0.408*** -0.165** 
 (0.051) (0.066) (0.069) (0.075) 
4 0.774*** 0.453*** -0.003 0.340*** 
 (0.051) (0.066) (0.069) (0.074) 
5 1.563*** 1.238*** 0.786*** 1.068*** 
 (0.052) (0.068) (0.069) (0.075) 
     
Observations 58787 59162 37293 33279 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Note: All estimations include state dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.Age is measured in linear splines (marginal) 20-30, 30-40, and 40-50, 50+.  




Table A.4: Results ordered probit estimation for education, spouse 
  Rural  Urban 
Variable 1993 2004  1993 2004 
   
 
  
Female -0.441*** -0.564*** -0.489*** -0.356* 
 (0.142) (0.147) (0.175) (0.184) 
Age1 -0.009** -0.028*** 0.019*** 0.016** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Age2 -0.012** -0.002 -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
Age3 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.014** 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Age4 0.019*** 0.007 0.011** -0.018** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
SC -0.675*** -0.617*** -1.042*** -0.855*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (0.033) 
ST -0.748*** -0.886*** -0.742*** -0.765*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.066) (0.072) 
Islam -0.437*** -0.502*** -0.769*** -0.697*** 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031) 
Christian 0.392*** 0.284*** 0.447*** 0.400*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.056) 
Other non-Hindu 0.191*** 0.404*** 0.340*** 0.499*** 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.044) (0.053) 
Cut-off values     
1 0.155 -0.889*** -0.881*** -1.054*** 
 (0.156) (0.172) (0.188) (0.200) 
2 0.525*** -0.640*** -0.588*** -0.835*** 
 (0.156) (0.172) (0.188) (0.200) 
3 1.003*** -0.147 -0.208 -0.464** 
 (0.156) (0.173) (0.188) (0.200) 
4 1.541*** 0.442** 0.216 0.022 
 (0.156) (0.174) (0.188) (0.200) 
5 2.417*** 1.321*** 0.976*** 0.801*** 
 (0.159) (0.179) (0.188) (0.200) 
     
Observations 48516 50565 28652 26769 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.05 
Note: All estimations include state dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Age is measured in marginal linear splines 20-30, 30-40, and 40-50, 50+.  




Table A.5: Results ordered probit estimation for household average number of children 
 1993, rural 2004, rural 1993, urban 2004, urban 
Variable Coef. Std.  Coef. Std.  Coef. Std.  Coef. Std.  
Female head -0.378 0.018 *** -0.247 0.023 *** -0.367 0.028 *** -0.232 0.038 *** 
Age head -0.002 0.000 *** -0.001 0.001 ** -0.003 0.001 *** -0.005 0.001 *** 
N females 1.010 0.030 *** 1.251 0.040 *** 0.985 0.052 *** 1.070 0.070 *** 
Age1 0.237 0.004 *** 0.274 0.005 *** 0.279 0.007 *** 0.270 0.010 *** 
Age2 -0.315 0.008 *** -0.389 0.010 *** -0.381 0.013 *** -0.401 0.016 *** 
Age3 -0.113 0.014 *** -0.101 0.017 *** -0.107 0.023 *** -0.070 0.024 *** 
females*age1 -0.108 0.004 *** -0.141 0.005 *** -0.137 0.007 *** -0.137 0.008 *** 
females*age2 0.130 0.007 *** 0.184 0.008 *** 0.175 0.010 *** 0.188 0.013 *** 
females*age3 0.071 0.013 *** 0.061 0.015 *** 0.057 0.021 *** 0.032 0.020  
Educf_0 0.238 0.041 *** 0.468 0.062 *** -0.605 0.065 *** -0.660 0.129 *** 
Educf_2 -0.042 0.016 *** -0.120 0.019 *** -0.093 0.027 *** -0.044 0.040  
Educf_3 -0.146 0.019 *** -0.241 0.017 *** -0.194 0.024 *** -0.239 0.033 *** 
Educf_4 -0.254 0.026 *** -0.325 0.020 *** -0.334 0.025 *** -0.376 0.032 *** 
Educf_5 -0.362 0.032 *** -0.462 0.026 *** -0.509 0.024 *** -0.501 0.034 *** 
Educf_6 -0.653 0.084 *** -0.684 0.066 *** -0.800 0.031 *** -0.819 0.038 *** 
SC -0.010 0.013  0.071 0.015 *** 0.133 0.024 *** 0.119 0.029 *** 
ST -0.056 0.017 *** 0.086 0.022 *** 0.024 0.042  0.055 0.052  
Muslim 0.336 0.019 *** 0.385 0.022 *** 0.409 0.025 *** 0.433 0.032 *** 
Christian 0.028 0.038  0.118 0.042 *** 0.109 0.040 *** 0.091 0.060  
Other -0.015 0.036  0.011 0.045  0.001 0.042  -0.019 0.053  
Cut-off values            
1 0.242 0.049  0.819 0.061  0.398 0.082  0.337 0.096  
2 0.929 0.049  1.512 0.061  1.117 0.083  1.097 0.096  
3 1.628 0.050  2.296 0.062  1.885 0.083  1.982 0.096  
4 2.295 0.050  2.948 0.062  2.611 0.084  2.674 0.097  
5 2.890 0.051  3.505 0.063  3.197 0.084  3.183 0.099  
6 3.395 0.051  3.986 0.064  3.681 0.086  3.594 0.101  
7 3.828 0.053  4.430 0.066  4.114 0.089  3.949 0.106  
8 4.152 0.055  4.783 0.069  4.474 0.095  4.339 0.111  
9 4.441 0.058  5.067 0.073  4.709 0.104  4.663 0.119  
10 4.679 0.063  5.279 0.080  4.799 0.110  4.851 0.126  
11 4.879 0.069  5.489 0.091  4.980 0.129  5.029 0.140  
12 5.137 0.080  5.818 0.088  5.136 0.149  5.167 0.159  
             
N 58787   59162   37293   33279   
pseudo R2 0.10   0.12   0.15   0.15   
Note: All estimations include state dummies. Sig ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05. Age is measured in linear splines 
(marginal) 20-30, 30-40, and 40+. Source: NSSO Consumer Expenditure survey. 
 

